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THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF   
  
A. Introduction 
Appellant files this reply brief to address a few points regarding two issues 
and otherwise stands on his opening brief.  Those issues concern the Bruton1  
and/or joinder issue and the Brady2 claim. 
 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Joinder  
First, Appellant responds to a complaint of the state concerning the failure 
to object to the pre-trial joinder. The state argues for the first time on appeal that 
Appellant “has not attempted to argue how, or if, his trial counsel should have 
anticipated the presentation of this particular evidence [statements and evidence 
presented at the subsequent trial] at the time of the state’s pretrial joinder 
motion.” Respondent’s brief, p. 11-12. 
Essentially the state is complaining that Appellant has not established who 
knew what when in regards to his attorney learning of the incriminating 
statements in relation to the trial.  However, the state has waived this argument 
since it did not raise it below, presumably because the prosecutor was aware of 
when these statements were produced in discovery. Had the state raised it 
                                            
1 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1970).   




below, Petitioner/Appellant could have established exactly when counsel would 
have learned about the statements and thus that he or she should have objected 
to the joinder or moved to sever.   
Second, the state, just like the district court and some other courts cited by 
the state, misunderstands the interplay, or really lack of interplay, between 
Crawford3 and Bruton.  
To understand the point of Bruton and why it is unaffected by Crawford, 
the procedure in use at the time must be considered.  In Bruton, two defendants 
were tried together, and the confession of one of them was admitted against him, 
but was inadmissible hearsay as to the other defendant.  Accordingly, a limiting 
instruction was given that the confession was not to be used in determining the 
guilt or innocence of the other defendant.  Bruton’s point was that a limiting 
instruction will not always be enough to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of a 
declarant’s co-defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that where a non-
testifying defendant's extrajudicial statement is "powerfully incriminating" against 
other defendants--the statement may not be used in a joint trial at all. Id. at 135-
36.  In such a case, "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is 
so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id.  at 135.  
. . . in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting 
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional 
right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as if there had 
been no instruction. 
                                            





Bruton, at p. 137.  
 
Crawford and then Davis4, on the other hand, each involved a single 
defendant and a hearsay statement made by a non-defendant witness. The 
issues in those cases respectively involved whether a testimonial  statement was 
procedurally reliable,  to wit, subject to cross-examination, and then, whether a 
statement was a substitute for testimony or not.  
In short, there are two lines of Confrontation Clause cases.  
Crawford/Davis dealt with constitutional reliability (i.e., cross-examination) of 
evidence admissible against the defendant, whereas Bruton dealt with the 
prejudice from evidence inadmissible  against the defendant.   
 Under Crawford/Davis, a non-testimonial hearsay statement which is 
admissible against the defendant himself is not barred by the Confrontation 
Clause.  However, under Bruton, any “powerfully incriminating” hearsay 
statement of a co-defendant that is inadmissible against the defendant under the 
rules of evidence also cannot be admitted at the joint trial due to the 
Confrontation Clause (unless redacted which is not a possibility here).  
Finally, as to the interplay between Bruton and Crawford/Davis, an 
important point is those cases had different concerns regarding the Confrontation 
Clause because they dealt with different kinds of trials due to the different 
numbers  of defendants on trial.  Crawford/Davis addressed whether admitting  
                                            




certain evidence against the defendant violates the defendant's right of 
confrontation.  Bruton and its progeny address a different concern--the prejudicial 
effect of the unconfronted evidence heard by a jury in a joint trial.  
So while both Bruton and Crawford address Confrontation Clause issues, 
in a joint defendant case it is Bruton that provides the governing standard.   
The distinction between the lines of Confrontation Clause cases is easy to 
overlook, and it is unsurprising that some courts have gotten it wrong and believe 
that Crawford has overruled or otherwise changed Bruton.  But it is now some 14 
years after Crawford was decided in 2004 and the United States Supreme Court, 
has still never held that it overruled Bruton. 5  
What is easy to consider, and the key to our issue, is the question of how 
would Paris’ statements be admissible at trial?  Again, they are “Vance, you’re 
going to prison” and you need to get rid of/burn those clothes because they are 
evidence (because of the blood on them).6  
The state never addresses the initial admissibly of the statements  except 
in a footnote. However, while Crawford might not keep Paris’ statements from 
being admitted against her, neither does it provide a basis for admitting them as 
the state seems to suggest.   
                                            
5 Even if this Court were to now hold that Crawford/Davis overruled or otherwise 
changed Bruton, that was not clearly established law in 2009 when this trial 
occurred, and which is the period of time  referenced for an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 481, 348 P.3d 1, 96 (2015). 
 
6 The state oddly asserts without explanation that these statements do not 
implicate or prejudice Vance.  But they directly and powerfully implicate him in a 
case where his defense was he didn’t do it.  
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The district court had two theories of why Paris’ statements were 
admissible. Both are wrong. First, the district court claimed Paris’ statements 
“were excited utterances” and second, the district court claimed that the “burn the 
clothes” statement was a statement against interest of Frankie Hughes, the 
witness who testified about it. In its brief the state does not even acknowledge 
the latter basis which is obviously wrong on its face and so the state concedes 
the error.  
Significantly, the state does not seriously argue that the statements were 
excited utterances either.  It merely adopts the district court’s analysis without 
further comment and does not even try to respond to Appellant’s arguments 
about why statements from an unexcited witness are not excited utterances.  
The proper way that Paris’ statements are admissible that is never 
mentioned by the state or district court, presumably  because it does not advance  
their cause, is as an admission of a party opponent under I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).   
However, they are only admissible against Paris as the party, not against Vance.   
This is why Bruton still applies, and the cases should have been severed.  
Actually, our problem is worse than that of Bruton where at least a limiting 
instruction was given (even though insufficient).  In our case, the statements 
were inadmissible against Vance, but came in without limitation despite no 
evidentiary basis under the Idaho Rules of Evidence and no opportunity to cross-




C. Brady Violation-fingerprint report  
First, the state argues that the Brady claim is forfeited because it could 
have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. This is simply wrong.  
The reason the Brady issue could not have been raised on direct appeal is 
because the fingerprint report was not in the appellate record. The reason the 
fingerprint report was not in the appellate record was not because of some failing 
of Appellant, but because it was not part of the district court record.  As shown 
even by the state’s explanation of the proceedings in its brief, the prosecution, 
acknowledging its late disclosure, “would not attempt to introduce the report as 
evidence at trial.”  Respondent’s brief, p. 43. 
Thus, the fingerprint report was not an offered but rejected exhibit that 
becomes part of the record. Nor was it otherwise made part of the district court 
record.  If anyone had a reason to make the report an exhibit it would be the 
prosecution to preserve the issue of the court’s exclusion of the report, but it did 
not do so.   
In this case, defense counsel certainly would not have placed the report 
into the record because as explained regarding the ineffective assistance of 
counsel component of this claim,  trial counsel did not recognize the exculpatory 
nature of the report.  Since retained counsel thought the report was bad for 
Vance she would have no reason to want it in the record.  Nor would appellate 
counsel in the direct appeal, assuming arguendo that he for some reason 
realized the exculpatory nature of the fingerprint report that was not in the record, 
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have any way to augment the appellate record with it since it was not part of the 
district court record.  
In short, an issue that is unsupported both in the criminal case district 
court record and the direct appeal appellate court record is properly brought in a 
petition for post-conviction relief.7  
Second, the state does not seriously argue that delayed disclosure cannot 
constitute a Brady violation. It argues only that there is no evidence that the 
report could have been produced sooner.  However, that is not the test for any 
Brady violation, which can be inadvertent and does not require bad faith.  Rather, 
for a late disclosure, a logical test to use is whether the defense received the 
report too late to effectively utilize it.  The state does not dispute this was the 
case, presumably because that is what the district court found when it excluded 
the report.  
Next as to the Brady issue, the state takes issue for the first time on 
appeal about what bottles were used in the attack versus the ones fingerprinted.  
What the state is doing without admitting it is controverting the district court’s 
factual findings:  The district court found:   
                                            
7 As an aside, Brady claims by their very nature are more suited to post-
convictions proceeding since they would generally require factual development. 
In this they are similar to ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are brought 
in post-convictions even if they theoretically could be brought on direct appeal.   
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374 (Ct.App. 1993). Thus, even if the fingerprint 
report was in the record of the direct appeal (or could have been), Appellant 
suggests that the same  practical rule also be followed for Brady claims and allow 




The fingerprint report showed that Petitioner’s fingerprints showed 
up only on a bottle of tequila and not on the beer and liquor bottles 
that were actually used as weapons during the fight. 
 
Order Granting State’s Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissing Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief, p. 38. (R. p. 387.)  
The state has again waived this argument by not raising it below in 
response to Petitioner’s allegations when factual development could have 
occurred.  
Finally, while strictly speaking the failure to provide discovery to Vance 
issue is separate from the Brady issue, it does rely on it and so will be discussed 
here.  The fingerprint report is the perfect example of discovery that Vance was 
not given.  Had he been, he would have discovered its exculpatory nature 
because he did so later and in any event, the exculpatory nature is apparent from 
the face of it. Trial counsel on the other hand suppressed the report without 
seeing it since she mistakenly thought it was inculpatory.    
Thus, had Vance timely been given the report he would have discovered 
its exculpatory nature and prevented his trial counsel from suppressing 
exculpatory scientific evidence which excluded him from using particular 
weapons and also impeached a main state’s witness.  
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated and in Appellant’s Opening Brief, 
Appellant respectfully requests the district court’s order summarily dismissing his  
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petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the district court.   
DATED this 22nd  day of June, 2018.       
      
/s/ Greg S. Silvey  
      Greg S. Silvey 
      Attorney for Appellant  
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